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Recent studies have focused on the role of the cerebellum in the social domain,
including in Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM, or the “mentalizing” process, is the ability to
attribute mental states, such as emotion, intentions and beliefs, to others to explain
and predict their behavior. It is a fundamental aspect of social cognition and crucial
for social interactions, together with more automatic mechanisms, such as emotion
contagion. Social cognition requires complex interactions between limbic, associative
areas and subcortical structures, including the cerebellum. It has been hypothesized
that the typical cerebellar role in adaptive control and predictive coding could also be
extended to social behavior. The present study aimed to investigate the social cognition
abilities of patients with degenerative cerebellar atrophy to understand whether the
cerebellum acts in specific ToM components playing a role as predictive structure.
To this aim, an ad hoc social cognition battery was administered to 27 patients with
degenerative cerebellar pathology and 27 healthy controls. In addition, 3D T1-weighted
and resting-state fMRI scans were collected to characterize the structural and functional
changes in cerebello-cortical loops. The results evidenced that the patients were
impaired in lower-level processes of immediate perception as well as in the more
complex conceptual level of mentalization. Furthermore, they presented a pattern of
GM reduction in cerebellar portions that are involved in the social domain such as crus
I-II, lobule IX and lobule VIIIa. These areas showed decreased functional connectivity
with projection cerebral areas involved in specific aspects of social cognition. These
findings boost the idea that the cerebellar modulatory function on the cortical projection
areas subtends the social cognition process at different levels. Particularly, regarding
the lower-level processes, the cerebellum may act by implicitly matching the external
information (i.e., expression of the eyes) with the respective internal representation to
guarantee an immediate judgment about the mental state of others. Otherwise, at a
more complex conceptual level, the cerebellum seems to be involved in the construction
of internal models of mental processes during social interactions in which the prediction
of sequential events plays a role, allowing us to anticipate the other person’s behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Estimation of mental states of others is a key aspect for
human communication and social interactions. This capacity is
a fundamental component of the social cognition and involves
both lower-level processes of immediate perception and higher-
level inferences (Coricelli, 2005; Van Overwalle et al., 2014).
The lower-level processes are automatic, refer to a primitive
understanding of another person’s mind and are based on action
and emotion recognition and “emotional contagion” (Meltzoff
andMoore, 1989). The higher-level inferences imply the capacity
to attribute mental states to others (such as emotion, intentions
and beliefs) and adopting the perspective of the other person to
understand and predict the behavior (Van Overwalle et al., 2014).
This ability is known as Theory of Mind (ToM) (Premack and
Woodruff, 1978; Brothers and Ring, 1990) or the “mentalizing”
process and is based on intentionality, empathy, and higher
depths of reasoning, requiring more conceptual and voluntary
processes (Coricelli, 2005).
Such complex functions require a correspondent sophisticated
neural mechanism. Indeed, complex interactions between limbic,
associative areas and subcortical structures are crucial to these
processes (Van Overwalle et al., 2014; Van Overwalle and
Mariën, 2016; Heleven and Van Overwalle, 2018). Within
the social cognition domain, ToM abilities seem to mainly
depend on a group of brain regions, called the “mentalizing
network,” which includes regions in the superior temporal sulcus
(STS), temporoparietal junction, medial precuneus, and medial
prefrontal cortex (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Aichhorn et al.,
2009). The neural circuitry underlying social cognition also
involves fronto-limbic connections (Beer et al., 2006), mirror
neurons in the ventral premotor and rostral posterior parietal
cortices (Rizzolatti et al., 2006), the amygdala (Adolphs, 2004),
the insula (Kipps et al., 2007; Gu et al., 2012), and the middle
temporal gyrus (Johnstone et al., 2006).
Most neuroanatomical models of social behavior/mentalizing
emphasize the putative role of the cortical regions (Abu-Akel and
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011) and fail to acknowledge the contribution
of the cerebellum. However, recent studies have focused on the
role of the cerebellum in the social domain, including some
aspects of ToM (Sokolov, 2018).
Abbreviations: AC-PC, anterior-posterior commissure; BA, Brodmann area;
BADA, Batteria per l’Analisi dei Deficit Afasici (Battery for the analysis of
the aphasic deficits); BOLD, blood oxygenation level dependent imaging; CB,
cerebellar patients; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; dmPFC, dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex; DMN, Default Mode Network; EA, Emotion Attribution test;
EPI, echo planar imaging; FC, functional connectivity; FLAIR, fluid attenuated
inversion recovery; FOV, field of view; FP, Faux Pas test; FWE, familywise error;
FWHM, full width at half maximum; GM, gray matter; HS, healthy subjects;
ICARS, International Cooperative Ataxia Rating Scale; MDEFT, Modified Driven
Equilibrium Fourier Transform; MNI, Montreal Neurologic Institute; RME,
Reading the Mind in the Eyes test; ROIs, regions of interest; RS-fMRI, resting-state
functional magnetic resonance imaging; SMA, supplementary motor area; SN,
Salience Network; SPM-8, Statistical Parametric Mapping version 8; STS, superior
temporal sulcus; SUIT, Spatially Unbiased Infratentorial Template; TE, echo time;
TI, inversion time; TR, repetition time; ToM, theory of mind; TSE, turbo spin echo;
VAS, Visual Analogue Scale; VBM, voxel-based morphometry.
The revolutionary view of a “social cerebellum” is supported
by observations of cerebellar activation in many functional
imaging studies involving social emotions and mental state
inference tasks (Brunet et al., 2000; Calarge et al., 2003) as well
as by findings showing that the performance of patients with
cerebellar damage is impaired in a range of perceptual (Ivry and
Keele, 1989; Ackermann et al., 1997), cognitive (Schmahmann
and Sherman, 1998; Tedesco et al., 2011), and ToM tasks
(Sokolov, 2018) that are essential in social interactions. In
particular, alterations in social cognition tasks are reported in
patients with complex cerebello-cerebral degeneration, such as
spino-cerebellar ataxia (SCA) type 1, SCA type 2, and SCA type
7 as well as in patients with isolated cerebellar degeneration,
such as SCA type 6, SCA type 8 and episodic ataxia type 2
(Sokolovsky et al., 2010; D’Agata et al., 2011; Hoche et al.,
2016).
Moreover, cerebellar abnormalities and dysfunctions of
cerebellar-cortical networks have been described in several
psychiatric disorders characterized by mentalizing impairments
(i.e., schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorders) (Andreasen
and Pierson, 2008; Fatemi et al., 2012).
The cerebellar function in social behavior is anatomically
supported by the fact that the cerebellum is incorporated
into associative and paralimbic circuits involved in social
cognition processes by way of feedforward connections
from these cerebral cortical areas to the cerebellum via the
pons (corticopontocerebellar projections) and by feedback
connections from the cerebellum through the thalamus
back to the cerebral cortex (cerebellothalamocerebral
projections) (Schmahmann and Pandya, 1997; Ramnani,
2012).
Although there is widespread agreement about the neural
substrate of social cognition, much less is known about the
neural representations and computations that are implemented
in cerebello-cerebral circuitries. In particular, the specific role of
the cerebellum in the social domain remains to be elucidated.
As it is well acknowledged, cerebellar operations in the
sensorimotor domain are believed to involve outcome prediction
based on forward models and signaling deviations from these
outcomes (prediction errors) to the cerebral cortex (Ito, 2006).
In particular, the cerebellum receives and combines the motor
commands with exteroceptive and proprioceptive sensory inputs,
generating a representation of the expected sensory consequences
of those commands (internal models) (Miall and Reckess, 2002).
Therefore, the sensory predictions generated by a forward
model can be used to coordinate motor output, providing a
means to anticipate the consequences of a motor command
and to update a state estimate of the motor system. These
predictions are constantly compared with afferent input, and
in the presence of deviations from prediction, the cerebellum
emits corrective signals. These error signals allow us to
refine future sensory predictions and reduce the prediction
error signal on subsequent movements (Wolpert and Kawato,
1998).
In the present work, we followed the hypothesis that
the typical cerebellar role in adaptive control and predictive
coding in the sensorimotor domain could be extended to the
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social cognition domain (Ito, 2008; Sokolov, 2018). Indeed,
anticipation, adaptation and learning appear indispensable for
successful social interactions. Particularly, prediction is a central
component of socioemotional processing (Brown and Brüne,
2012; Koster-Hale and Saxe, 2013) in the sense that the
understanding and inference of another individual’s state of mind
requires not only the creation of a mental model of that mental
state but also the ability to simulate how it might influence the
others’ behavior. Recognizing deviations from our expectation in
the outcome of a social interaction and using that information
to calibrate future social predictions guarantee adaptive social
behavior (Sokolov et al., 2017).
In the complex mentalizing process, the predictions are
allowed by stored internal models of human behaviors based
on expectations that actions will be rational and efficient and
consistent with individual beliefs, personality traits, or social
norms (Koster-Hale and Saxe, 2013). Thus, in analogy with
the information processing in the sensorimotor domain, the
cerebellum might modulate the high-order cortical activity
(Middleton and Strick, 2000) by detecting predictable sequences
(i.e., internal model of a social action) and allowing optimized
feedforward control that is necessary to accomplish these
functions in a fluid and automated manner (Leggio et al., 2011;
Leggio and Molinari, 2015). If this is the case, a cerebellar
malfunction that interferes with using the internal model would
prevent the prediction function and the correct inferences about
the others’ mental state or the recognition of a deviance from the
expected social behavior.
In the present work, we investigated the social cognition
abilities of patients with degenerative cerebellar atrophy to
understand whether the cerebellum plays a role in particular
components of social cognition and to elucidate its role as a
predictor in social interactions. To this aim, the participants
were tested using an ad hoc social cognition battery to examine
the unconscious and automatic process and the more complex
and conscious aspects of ToM by using tasks in which the
stimuli implied different levels of prediction. Considering the
etiological heterogeneity of the cerebellar disease in the present
population, a morpho-volumetric analyses was also performed
to characterize the common cerebellar structural changes and
their neuroanatomical localization. Moreover, considering that
meta-analytic connectivity data in healthy subjects and studies
in patients affected by SCA2 indicated interactions between the
cerebellum and cerebral areas that are crucial in social cognition
(Habas et al., 2009; VanOverwalle et al., 2015; Olivito et al., 2017),
functional connectivity (FC) between the common cerebellar
areas affected in our sample and the cerebral cortex was analyzed
by means of resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging
(RS-fMRI) (Friston et al., 1993; Biswal et al., 1997; van de Ven
et al., 2004).
We expected that the cerebellar structural alterations that
occurred in patients affected by cerebellar degeneration would
interfere with the modulatory function of the cerebellum on the
cortical projection areas involved in thementalizing process. This
interference could account for specific impaired ToM outcomes,




Twenty-seven patients affected by degenerative cerebellar
atrophy (CB) [mean age/SD: 46.4/10.8 (years); mean
education/SD: 13.1/3.3 (years); M/F: 6/21] were recruited
at the Ataxia Lab of the Santa Lucia Foundation Hospital.
They were selected from among those in-patients and out-
patients admitted between the 2014 and 2017 (n. 38) for
rehabilitation or clinical follow up. Only the patients presented
with diffuse cerebellar atrophy and no other brain macroscopic
abnormalities, as detected by visual inspection of clinical MRI
scans, were enrolled in the study.
At the time of the assessment, all the 27 patients had more
than 6 months of illness from the diagnosis and showed a pure
cerebellar motor syndrome, with no extra-cerebellar symptoms,
as evidenced by a comprehensive neurological examination. The
International Cooperative Ataxia Rating Scale (ICARS, Trouillas
et al., 1997) was used to quantify the cerebellar motor signs.
The demographic and clinical characteristics of the patients are
reported in Table 1.
Additionally, 27 well-matched healthy subjects (HS) [mean
age/SD: 45.9/9.7 (years); mean education/SD: 13.1/2.6 (years);
M/F: 6/21] with no history of neurological or psychiatric illness
were enrolled in the study. T-test analyses showed no significant
difference in the mean age (t = 0.17; p = 0.62) and educational
level (t = −0.05; p = 0.20) between the two groups. Raven’s
47 Progressive Matrices test (Raven, 1949) was administered to
assess intellectual level and used as inclusion criterion.
The Ethics Committee of Fondazione Santa Lucia (IRCCS)
approved the present study, according to the principles expressed
in the Declaration of Helsinki, and written informed consent was
obtained from all the participants.
Neuropsychological Screening
A neuropsychological battery was administered to the CB
patients to assess the following domains: current intellectual
functioning [Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–Revised
(Wechsler, 1981; Orsini and Laicardi, 1997)]; verbal
comprehension [Token test (De Renzi and Vignolo, 1962)];
verbal production [Denomination of words subtest of the
BADA–Batteria per l’Analisi dei Deficit Afasici–(Miceli et al.,
1994); Phrase Construction subtest of the Italian-language
Mental Deterioration Battery (Caltagirone et al., 1995)]; verbal
memory [Immediate and Delayed recall of Rey’s 15 words
(Rey, 1958); forward and backward digit span (Wechsler, 1945;
Orsini et al., 1987)]; episodic memory [Short-Story Recall task
(Carlesimo et al., 2002)]; visuospatial memory [Rey-Osterrieth
Complex Figure Test (recall) (Caffarra et al., 2002); Corsi Test
Corsi, 1972]; visuospatial ability [Rey-Osterrieth Complex
Figure (copy) (Caffarra et al., 2002)]; attention [Multiple
features targets cancellation task (Marra et al., 2013); Lines
cancellation task (Albert, 1973); Trail Making Test (Giovagnoli
et al., 1996)]; and executive functions [Phonological fluency
(Borbowsky et al., 1967); Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton,
1981)].
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Social Cognition Tasks
To investigate social cognition abilities, the following tests were
administered.
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RME) (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001; Serafin and Surian, 2004) was used to assess the
automatic lower-level processes of emotion and mental state
attribution based on immediate perceptions of the eye-region
expression and regardless of the context. Indeed, within the
face, the eyes are the most important contact between agents
(Hainline, 1978; Maurer, 1985). This test was made up of 36
photos of actors’ eyes, and for each, the participants had to
choose from four alternative words the one that best described
what the person in the photograph is thinking or feeling.
This process is assumed to involve an unconscious, automatic
and rapid matching of past memories/categorization concerning
similar expressions with a lexicon of mental state terms to
arrive at a judgment of which word the eyes most closely match
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Responses were scored 1 or 0 for
correctness.
The Emotion Attribution test (EA) (Blair and Cipolotti, 2000;
Prior et al., 2003) was used to assess the ability to attribute
emotions to others in a social context. Fifty-eight short stories
describing an emotional situation were presented to the subject
and required providing a one-word description of how the
main character might feel in that situation. The sentences
were designed to elicit sadness, fear, embarrassment, disgust,
happiness, anger or envy. The sequential events of the story
were explicit and univocal, requiring a low level of prediction
about the emotional consequences of the event (see Appendix
in Supplementary Material for example of the story). The correct
answer was based on the coherent expectation about the social
interaction.
The Faux Pas test (FP) (Stone et al., 1998; Liverta Sempio
et al., 2005) was used to assess a more advanced capacity to
make inferences regarding another person’s state of mind. This
test included 10 stories in which a social “faux pas” occurred
(“faux pas” stories) and 10 control stories in which no social
“faux pas” occurred (“no-faux pas” stories) (see Appendix in
Supplementary Material for examples of the stories).
A social “faux pas” occurs when a speaker says something
without considering that the listener might not want to hear
it or might be hurt by what has been said, implying false or
mistaken belief. To recognize the “faux pas,” the subject had to
understand that the person committing the faux pas does not
know that they should not say it and that the person hearing
it would be upset by the faux pas. Moreover, the subject had to
identify a wrong behavior or action with respect to the predicted
social norms or a more likely behavior in the social interaction.
In the “faux pas” stories, the sequential events are unexpected
and not univocal and a constant comparison between the event
and the social expectation are necessary, thus requiring a high
level of prediction. Conversely, in the “no-faux pas” stories, the
sequential events are explicit and univocal, requiring a low level
of prediction about the consequences of the event.
All the stories were read to participants, while they had a copy
of the story to read along and check back over (to reduce the
memory requirement). When a “faux pas” was identified, five
clarifying questions were proposed to evaluate the understanding
of the mental states and emotions of the agents involved in the
stories. Each “faux pas” story question correctly answered was
scored as 1, resulting in a maximum score of 6 for each story.
The “no-faux pas” stories were given a score of 2 if they
were correctly identified as not containing a faux pas. Two more
control questions were asked for all 20 stories to confirm that the
participant had a factual understanding of the stories.
The Advanced ToM task (Happè, 1994; Blair and Cipolotti,
2000; Prior et al., 2003; Van Harskamp et al., 2005) was used to
assess the more advanced concepts of ToM, such as double bluff,
white lies, and persuasion. The participant was presented with
13 stories describing naturalistic social situations and was asked
to interpret and justify the behavior of the main character. The
subject had to accurately identify the underlying intention behind
a character’s utterance that was not literally true and to explain
why the main character acted in a particular manner. Successful
performance required the attribution of mental states, such as
desires, beliefs or intentions, and higher-order mental states, such
as one character’s belief about what another character knows. The
sequential events of the story were not univocal as in the FP
stories, requiring a high level of prediction about the consequence
of the events. The correct answer was based on the capacity to
make a choice taking into account different expectations about
the social interaction (see Appendix in Supplementary Material
for examples of the stories).
Visual Analog Scales for Mood and Anxiety
The possible anxiety and mood effects on emotional evaluation
have been controlled by using the self-evaluation ‘Visual
Analogue Scale’ (VAS) (Hayes and Paterson, 1921). The VAS
consists of a horizontal line, 100mm in length, anchored at each
end by a word descriptor and the subject is required to mark on
the line the point they felt best represented how they perceived
their current state. The VAS score is calculated by measuring the
distance from the left-hand end of the line to the point that the
subject marked in millimeters.
Two VAS were used to assess the two different domains:
anxiety (0mm, no anxiety and 100mm, the worst anxiety ever)
and mood (0mm, the worst mood and 100mm, the best mood
ever).
Data Analyses
Non-parametric Mann- Whitney U test for independent samples
was used to detect differences in accuracy row score of each test
between CB patients and HS. Spearman rank-order correlation
coefficient was used to correlate each test score with the VAS, the
ICARS total score, the disease duration and executive function
scores to exclude the possible effect of mood, motor impairment
and executive function on social cognition performance. The
statistical analyses were performed using Statistica software 12
(http://www.statsoft.com).
MRI Data Acquisition Protocol
All participants underwent an MRI examination at 3T
(Magnetom Allegra, Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). MRI
image acquisition included the following: (1) dual-echo turbo
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spin echo (TSE) [repetition time (TR) = 6190ms, echo time
(TE) = 12/109ms] and (2) T2 fluid attenuated inversion
recovery (FLAIR) [TR = 8170ms, TE = 96ms, inversion
time (TI) = 2100ms] for conventional MRI visualization of
the brain; (3) anatomical 3D Modified Driven Equilibrium
Fourier Transform (MDEFT) scan [TR = 1338ms, TE = 2.4ms,
matrix = 256 × 224 × 176, in-plane field of view (FOV) = 250
× 250 mm2, slice thickness = 1mm] for structural T1-weighted
imaging of the brain; (4) T2∗ weighted echo planar imaging
(EPI) sensitized to blood oxygenation level dependent imaging
(BOLD) contrast [TR: 2080ms, TE: 30ms, 32 axial slices parallel
to anterior-posterior commissure (AC-PC) line, matrix: 64× 64,
pixel size: 3× 3 mm2, slice thickness: 2.5mm, flip angle: 70◦] for
resting-state functional MRI (RS-fMRI).
BOLD echo planar images were collected during rest for
a 7min and 20 s period, resulting in a total of 220 volumes.
During this acquisition, subjects were instructed to keep their
eyes closed, not to think of anything in particular, and not to fall
asleep. The absence of macroscopic extra cerebellar abnormalities
was excluded by the visual inspection of the TSE and FLAIR
scans of patients, acquired as part of this research study, by
an expert neuroradiologist. According to the inclusion criteria,
conventional MRI scans of HS were also reviewed and any
pathological conditions affecting the brain was excluded.
Image Processing
T1-Weighted Scans
Anatomical T1-weighted images were used to quantify the
cerebellar gray matter (GM) patterns. The cerebellum was
preprocessed individually using the Spatially Unbiased
Infratentorial Template (SUIT) toolbox (Diedrichsen et al.,
2009) implemented in Statistical Parametric Mapping version 8
[WellcomeDepartment of Imaging Neuroscience; SPM-8 (http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/)]. The procedure involved cropping
and isolating the cerebellum from the T1 anatomical images,
normalizing each cropped image into SUIT space, reslicing the
probabilistic cerebellar atlas into individual subjects’ space using
the deformation parameters obtained by normalization, and
smoothing the images using 8-mm full width at half maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian kernel. Additionally, every participant’s
MDEFT was also segmented in SPM to estimate the total GM
volume and a two sample t-test was performed to compared the
GM total volume between groups to exclude the presence of
cerebral atrophy in patients.
Resting-State fMRI Data
FMRI data were preprocessed using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm/) and in-house software implemented inMATLAB
(The Mathworks Inc., Natick, Massachussetts, USA). For each
subject, the first four volumes of the fMRI series were discarded
to allow for T1 equilibration effects. The preprocessing steps
included correcting for head motion, compensating for slice-
dependent time shifts, normalizing to the EPI template in
Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) coordinates provided with
SPM8, and smoothing with a 3D Gaussian Kernel with 8 mm3
full-width at half maximum. For each data set, motion correction
was checked to ensure that the maximum absolute shift did
not exceed 2mm and the maximum absolute rotation did not
exceed 1.5◦. The global temporal drift was removed using a 3rd
order polynomial fit, and the signal was regressed against the
realignment parameters and the signal averaged over whole brain
voxels to remove other potential sources of bias. Then, all images
were filtered by a phase-insensitive band-pass filter (passband
0.01–0.08Hz) to reduce the effect of low frequency drift and high
frequency physiological noise.
Neuroimaging Data Analysis
Since 5 CB (CB3, CB13, CB23, CB32, CB34) patients did not
complete the MRI protocol due to claustrophobic concerns and
2 HS were excluded from the MRI data analyses due to motion
exceeding the set thresholds (2mm translation and 1.5◦ rotation)
during their MRI scans, only 22 CB patients (mean age/SD:
46.2/11.7; M/F: 4/18) and 25 HS (mean age/SD: 53.8/5.9; M/F:
6/19) were included in the final MRI data analyses.
Voxel-Based Morphometry
The individual GM maps obtained were used to perform
statistical analysis and to assess differences in regional cerebellar
volume between CB patients and HS by performing voxel-
based morphometry (VBM) and a voxelwise two-sample t-test
in SPM-8 to compare the GM maps. Age and sex were set as
variables of no interest. The results were considered significant
at p-values < 0.05 after familywise error (FWE) cluster-level
correction.
FIGURE 1 | Results of the social cognition battery. Data are presented as the
percentage of the total number of correct responses for the RME (max = 36),
for the Advanced ToM test (max = 13), faux pas stories (max = 60) and
no-faux pas stories (max = 20), and for the EA test (max = 58). Mean and
standard deviation of the accuracy percentage, where 0% is totally wrong and
100% is totally correct, are reported for both patients and healthy subjects;
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.005.
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Definition of Regions of Interest (ROIs) and
Seed-Based fMRI Analyses
Based on the VBM results, specific cerebellar regions were
identified and used as regions of interest (ROIs) in the seed-
based analysis. Each cerebellar region of significantly reduced
GM volume was extracted according to the SUIT atlas template
of the cerebellum (Diedrichsen et al., 2009) using the FSL
command line from the FMRIB software library (FSL, www.
fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/) and resliced into EPI standard space. The
mean time course of the voxels within the affected ROI was
calculated for every participant and used as a regressor in
a 1st level SPM analysis, thus extracting the voxels in the
whole brain showing a significant correlation with it. At the
second level, a two-sample t-test model was used to explore
differences in connectivity between CB patients and HS in
the ROI. To remove the effect of confounding variables, the
quantity of total brain GM volume, age and sex were entered
in the analysis as covariates of no interest. The results were




The performances obtained by the CB patients in the
neuropsychological evaluation are reported in Table 2. The
neuropsychological assessment revealed the presence of selective
and very slight impairments in some patients but did not show
clear evidence of general cognitive impairment. Indeed, only
some patients displayed impaired performance in specific tasks,
as shown in Table 2.
Social Cognition Profile
In the RME test, the CB patients showed an impaired
performance compared to HS (MWU = 163; Z = −2.89;
p = 0.004). Moreover, the patients failed in the Advanced ToM
test, with a significantly lower score than HS (MWU = 255;
Z = −2.02; p = 0.041). In the Faux Pas test, the patients
obtained significantly lower scores than HS selectively in the
“faux pas” stories (MWU = 228.5; Z = −2.36; p = 0.018), while
no significant difference was observed in the “no-faux pas” stories
(MWU = 347.5; Z = −0.23; p = 0.82). Normal performance
TABLE 1 | Clinical and demographic characteristics of the cerebellar patients.







1 CB1 FRDA F 47 13 24 59 –
2 CB3 SCA2 F 38 12 12 33 CAG 22/41
3 CB4 SCA2 F 42 13 12 47 CAG 22/39
4 CB5 ICA F 53 11 7 21 –
5 CB7 Cerebellitis F 59 13 - 12 –
6 CB9 SCA2 F 44 18 13 26 CAG/CTG 14/47
7 CB12 ICA F 59 13 8 16 –
8 CB13 ICA F 56 13 17 29 –
9 CB14 ICA F 52 13 44 28 –
10 CB15 SCA1 F 24 16 12 33 CAG 27/57
11 CB16 SCA2 F 36 13 8 37 CAG 22/42
12 CB17 ICA F 24 13 10 8 –
13 CB18 ICA F 46 13 24 9 –
14 CB20 SCA15 F 51 14 48 44 ITPR1 gene Heterozygous deletions
15 CB21 SCA2 F 54 18 12 27 CAG 22/37
16 CB22 SCA28 F 42 18 – 21 –
17 CB23 SCA15 F 56 13 – 35 ITPR1 gene Heterozygous deletions
18 CB24 SCA2 F 60 8 48 31 CAG 22/37
19 CB26 FRDA M 29 13 48 25 –
20 CB27 SCA2 M 40 8 36 18 CAG 22/38
21 CB29 SCA2 M 64 17 36 27 CAG 22/35
22 CB30 SCA2 F 43 13 12 28 CAG
23 CB31 ICA F 62 18 – 17 –
24 CB32 SCA1 M 45 8 48 33 CAG/CTG 18/58
25 CB33 SCA2 M 42 8 12 24 CAG 22/39
26 CB34 SCA2 M 42 18 12 17 CAG 22/39
27 CB35 ICA F 44 8 – 33 –
The table reports for each patient diagnosis, gender, age, education, disease duration, the total motor scores as assessed by the International Cooperative Ataxia Rating Scale (ICARS)
(Trouillas et al., 1997) and the CGA repeats. *ICARS: minimum score 0 (absence of motor deficits), maximum score 100 (maximum presence of motor deficits); FRDA, Friedreich’s ataxia;
SCA1, spinocerebellar ataxia type 1; SCA2, spinocerebellar ataxia type 2; SCA15, spinocerebellar ataxia type 15; SCA28, spinocerebellar ataxia type 28; ICA, Idiopathic Cerebellar
Atrophy; F, Female; M, Male.
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was detected in the EA test total score (MWU = 310;
Z = −0.94; p = 0.34). Boxplots of the row scores obtained
by CB and HS in each social cognition task are reported in
Supplementary Figure 1.
The percentage of accuracy, calculated as the percentage of the
correct responses for each test, is shown in Figure 1.
No correlations were evidenced between each task score
and the ICARS total score, the disease duration and executive
function scores. Regarding the VAS scores, an inverse correlation
was detected only between VAS-Mood and EA score. The




The between-group voxel wise comparison of the GM maps
revealed a statistically significant GM loss in the cerebellar cortex
of CB patients compared to HS. More specifically, a large cluster
of significantly decreased GM volume (cluster size: 34334; FWE
p = 0.05) was found. Peak voxels were centered in the left and
right lobules I-IV of the anterior cerebellum and right lobule VI
with extension in the left side and vermis portion and in the
left and right crus I-II. A second large cluster of significantly
decreased GM volume (cluster size: 11568; FWE p = 0.05) was
also found. Peak voxels were centered in the bilateral hemispheric
TABLE 2 | Neuropsychological results for the CB patients.
Neuropsychological Tests Mean (sd) Range Cut-off Number impaired Not tested
INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING
WAIS-R 88.30 (13.11) 61–115 <70 1 (CB35) –
Ravens’ 47 29.44 (3.20) 22–34 <18.96 – –
VERBAL COMPREHENSION
Token test 32.50 (1.53) 29–35 <32 1 (CB21) 1 (CB27)
VERBAL PRODUCTION
Denomination of words described by the
examiner
1.22 (1.51) 0–5 >2 2 (CB3, CB33) 4 (CB1, CB27, CB9, CB35)
Phrase Construction 10.64 (2.61) 3–15 <8.72 3 (CB5, CB14, CB21) 5 (CB1, CB3, CB7, CB9, CB12)
VERBAL MEMORY
Rey’s 15 mots short term 44.24 (6.47) 34–61 <28.53 – 1 (CB7)
Rey’s 15 mots long term 9.92 (2.36) 5–14 <4.69 – 1 (CB7)
Forward digit span 5.72 (0.89) 4–8 <5 2 (CB5, CB24) 1 (CB7)
Backward digit span 4.32 (1.07) 3–7 <3 – 1 (CB7)
EPISODIC MEMORY
Short-Story recall 10.75 (3.57) 2–15 <4.75 2 (CB4, CB33) 1 (CB7)
VISUOSPATIAL MEMORY
Rey-Osterrieth figure (recall) 12.57 (6.76) 1–27 <9.47 7 (CB3, CB4, CB14, CB21,
CB29, CB30, CB32)
1 (CB7)
Forward Corsi 5.36 (1.19) 3–9 <5 5 (CB5, CB12, CB15, CB16,
CB35)
2 (CB7, CB4)
Backward Corsi 4.64 (1.11) 3–8 <3 – 2 (CB7, CB4)
VISUOSPATIAL ABILITY
Rey-Osterrieth figure (copy) 30.97 (3.60) 18–36 <28.88 2 (CB3, CB32) 1 (CB7)
ATTENTION
Multiple features targets cancellation task 0.93 (0.07) 0–1 <0.869 2 (CB14, CB30) 1 (CB7)
Lines cancellation task 0.28 (0.74) 0–3 – – 1 (CB7)
Trail making test:
A
65.13 (28.26) 29–153 ≥94 1 (CB33) 3 (CB7, CB9, CB35)
B 127.54 (37.14) 60–211 ≥283 – 3 (CB7, CB9, CB35)
A-B 59.71 (37.01) −8 to 178 ≥187 – 3 (CB7, CB9, CB35)
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
Phonological fluency (FAS) 30.38 (9.04) 17–54 <17.35 1 (CB9) 1 (CB7)
WCST:
Total Errors 107.62 (10.48) 81–119 <85-91 1 (CB9) 1 (CB7)
Perseverative Responses 110.58 (24.38) 81–138 <85-91 – 1 (CB7)
Perseverative Errors 114.54 (13.71) 81–138 <85-91 1 (CB9) 1 (CB7)
The patients’ performance to each test was considered impaired when the score was below the cut-off value, with exception of the “Denomination of words described by the examiner”
and the “Trial making test” in which the performance resulted impaired when the score was higher than the cut-off value.
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TABLE 3 | Correlations between each social cognition tasks score and the VAS, the ICARS total score, the disease duration and executive functions scores (WCST, FAS).
RME ToM “FP” Stories “no-FP” Stories EA
VAS-Mood R = −0.27 R = 0.11 R = −0.20 R = 0.09 R = −0.60
P = 0.25 P = 0.61 P = 0.34 P = 0.68 P = 0.00
VAS-Anxiety R = 0.02 R = 0.01 R = 0.26 R = −0.17 R = −0.22
P = 0.93 P = 0.98 P = 0.22 P = 0.43 P = 0.30
ICARS Total Score R = −0.07 R = −0.41 R = 0.12 R = −0.13 R = 0.11
P = 0.74 P = 0.06 P = 0.54 P = 0.53 P = 0.58
Disease Duration R = −0.16 R = −0.20 R = −0.02 R = 0.05 R = −0.15
P = 0.50 P = 0.38 P = 0.94 P = 0.83 P = 0.50
WCST (Total Errors) R = −0.08 R = −0.02 R = −0.24 R = 0.00 R = −0.03
P = 0.72 P = 0.93 P = 0.25 P = 0.99 P = 0.88
WCST (Perseverative Errors) R = −0.07 R = −0.10 R = −0.22 R = 0.01 R = −0.11
P = 0.76 P = 0.64 P = 0.27 P = 0.95 P = 0.60
FAS R = 0.02 R = −0.31 R = 0.22 R = 0.09 R = 0.05
P = 0.94 P = 0.12 P = 0.29 P = 0.69 P = 0.79
VAS, Visual Analogue Scale; ICARS, International Cooperative Ataxia Rating Scale; WCST, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; FAS, Phonological fluency.
lobule VIIIa as well as vermis VIIIa with extension in vermis IX
(Figure 2). Detailed results with peak voxel coordinates of voxel
wise analyses are reported in Table 4.
No significant differences were found between total GM
volumes of CB patients (mean = 645.91 mm3; SD = 68.05) and
HS (mean = 656 mm3; SD = 49.93) as assessed by the t-test
analysis (t-value 0.8567; p= 0.39).
Seed-Based fMRI Analysis
Taking into account the VBM results, specific cerebellar regions
of reduced GM were chosen as ROIs for the seed-based analysis
(see section Materials and Methods). A total of 13 different voxel
wise analyses were performed. When comparing CB patients and
HS, selectively in the CB patients, distinct patterns of significantly
decreased FC were found between cerebellar ROIs and the
cerebral cortex (Figure 3; Table 5).
In the anterior cerebellum, lobules I-IV showed decreased FC
with cortical regions related tomotor and somatosensory control,
such as the precentral gyrus (BA 4, 6), postcentral gyrus (BA 3,
43), rolandic operculum, and inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44, 45).
Moreover, decreased FC was also evidenced with cerebral areas
involved in mentalizing processes, such as the supramarginal
gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24, 32), posterior cingulate
cortex (BA 23) (right lobule I-IV), left orbitofrontal cortex (BA
47) and middle frontal gyrus (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex -
dlPFC - BA 46) (Figure 3A).
In the intermediate cerebellum, lobule VI showed a decreased
FC with the middle frontal gyrus (dlPFC - BA 46), left premotor
cortex (BA 6), inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) and temporal pole
area (BA 38) (Figure 3B).
In the posterior cerebellum, crus I-II showed decreased FC
with cortical regions implicated in more complex and abstract
aspects of social cognition. In particular, decreased FC was found
between the left crus I-II and the middle frontal gyrus, the
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) (BA 8, 9), the superior
frontal gyrus (BA 10) and the orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11).
Reduced FC was also present between the right crus I and
left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) and precentral gyrus (in the
supplementary motor area - SMA - BA 6) (Figure 3C).
No significant functional alterations were found between the
right crus II, the right and left lobule VIIIa and the cerebral
cortex.
Finally, decreased FC was evidenced between specific portions
of the vermis and cerebral areas involved in emotional processing
or belonging to mirroring and mentalizing networks, such as the
middle frontal gyrus (dmPFC - BA 9), anterior cingulate cortex
(BA 32, 24), premotor cortex and supplementarymotor areas (BA
6, 8), orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11, 47), inferior frontal gyrus (BA
44), middle frontal gyrus (dlPFC - BA 46), angular gyrus, and
superior temporal sulcus (STS) (BA 21/22) (Figure 3D).
A detailed report of the seed-based analyses with MNI
coordinates, and peak Z scores is summarized in Table 5, where
the numbers of voxels in each cluster express the extension and
magnitude of significant FC modifications and the peak z-scores
express the highest significance in a voxel.
DISCUSSION
In recent decades, the cerebellum has been acknowledged
as a central area in the context of adaptive control and
predictive coding, including the prediction and organization of
sensorimotor and cognitive behavior (Ito, 2008; Molinari et al.,
2009; D’Angelo and Casali, 2013; Sokolov et al., 2017).
In the present study, we used well-known social cognitive
tasks focusing on different anticipation/prediction requirements
to clarify the possible role of the cerebellum as a predictor in
social interactions. As previously stated, in social interactions,
at least two distinct processes are fundamental: lower-level
processes of immediate perception that include an immediate
affective response (i.e., the visceral feelings perceived when we
look at another fearful, smiling or crying person) and a more
reflective and conscious representation based on the role and
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FIGURE 2 | Between-group voxel-based comparison of cerebellar GM density. Cerebellar regions showing patterns of significantly reduced GM in CB compared to
HS are reported and superimposed on the Spatially Unbiased Infratentorial Template (SUIT) (Diedrichsen et al., 2009) in coronal (y = 36), axial (z = 19) and sagittal
(x = 50) slices. Clusters of significantly decreased GM in the cerebellum are shown in green (cluster size: 343334) and light blue (cluster size: 11568). The results
significant at p-values < 0.05 after family wise error (FWE) cluster-level correction. Images are shown in radiological convention.
TABLE 4 | Statistics of voxel wise comparisons of cerebellar GM density (CB < HS).
Cluster Size
(NoV)
Coordinates Cluster Peak Z-score Brain region
x y z
34334 −10 −38 −19 5.23 L-Hem I-IV
13 −38 −22 5.12 R-Hem I-IV
22 −63 −25 4.66 R-Hem VI
11568 −23 −57 −50 4.65 L-Hem VIIIa
0 −59 −34 4.51 R-Hem VIIIa
23 −58 −49 4.50 Vermal-VIIIa
perspective taking (i.e., the capacity to suppose and understand
why a person is scared, happy, or sad) to make predictions about
imminent or future social behavior (Coricelli, 2005; Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2009).
Interestingly, we found that our cohort of patients presented
with alterations both in the immediate and automatic perception
of emotion and mental state and in the more complex conceptual
level of ToM process. Specifically, the CB patients showed an
impaired performance in the RME test, which involves the
automatic attribution of relevant mental states regardless of
the context. The RME test requires the subjects to “tune in”
to the mental state of the actor’s eye-region expression at an
unconscious, rapid, and automatic level (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001). In this case, automaticity and categorization are crucial to
determine the meaning of expression (Knutson et al., 2007) and
to infer the other’s mental state (Hoche et al., 2016).
Looking at the more complex level of the mentalizing process,
the CB patients showed impairments in the Advanced ToM task
and in the social “faux pas” stories (Stone et al., 1998; Blair and
Cipolotti, 2000). In these conditions, the sequential events are
unexpected and not univocal, requiring a constant comparison
between the event and the social expectation and a high level of
prediction. For example, the detection of a “faux pas” (i.e., when
someone says something they should not and not realizing they
should not say it) requires not only the cognitive understanding
that a person has said something inappropriate with respect to
the expected behavioral patterns but also the prediction of the
consequences of the actor’s behavior. The subject is required to
predict the actor’s behavior based on previous experiences to
recognize the upcoming error.
When the patterns of the stories required a minor level of
prediction and of error monitoring, such as in the “no-faux
pas” stories and in the Emotion Attribution test, the CB patients
showed good performance. Indeed, in these conditions, the social
situation was univocal and well described in the story text.
Our results are in line with earlier reports of patients
affected by cerebellar pathology that revealed specific deficits
in the RME test (Hoche et al., 2016) and in social emotion
identification from faces (D’Agata et al., 2011; Adamaszek et al.,
2014). Moreover, an impairment in the Advanced ToM task
was found in patients with superficial siderosis (a pathological
condition predominantly involving the cerebellum), despite
normal performance on the Emotion Attribution test and social
judgment tasks (Van Harskamp et al., 2005).
In our cohort of CB patients, the alterations in specific
aspects of ToM are not explained by a generalized intellectual
and/or a verbal comprehension impairment. Indeed, the
neuropsychological assessment revealed the presence of selective
and very slight impairments in some patients but did not show
clear evidence of general cognitive impairment. This result
is consistent with findings that patients who are affected by
cerebellar damage do not present with intellectual deterioration
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FIGURE 3 | Cerebello-cerebral functional connectivity. Cerebellar regions of interest and corresponding cluster of decreased functional connectivity in the cerebral
cortex. (A) Anterior cerebellar ROIs (I-IV, in red); (B) intermediate cerebellar ROIs (VI, in blue); (C) posterior cerebellar ROIs (crus I, in yellow; crus II, in magenta); (D)
vermal cerebellar ROIs (VI, VIIIa, IX, in green). Cluster of significantly decreased functional connectivity in the cerebral cortex of patients, shown in coronal (y), axial (z),
and sagittal (x) slices. Cluster-level FWE correction (p < 0.05). Detailed statistics and coordinates of the peak voxels showing statistical significance in the cluster are
reported in Table 5. R = right, L = left.
(Tedesco et al., 2011). It is worth noting that in cerebellar
patients’ cohorts, mostly standard norms of testing do not detect
cognitive impairments characterizing the “cerebellar cognitive
affective syndrome” (CCAS) (Schmahmann and Sherman, 1998),
and very often they can be detected only when the patients
are compared to matched healthy controls. In this respect, a
scale was recently published to diagnose the CCAS (Hoche
et al., 2018), but we unfortunately collected our data before
its publication. Moreover, our sample had no difficulties in
understanding other story-type stimuli, such as “no-faux pas”
stories or emotion attribution tasks. Additionally, it is also
unlikely that a generalized executive impairment accounts
for our patients’ mentalizing deficit, considering the absence
of correlation between the ToM scores and the executive
test scores in our cohort. This claim is in line with the
increasing literature suggesting that executive functioning and
ToM abilities are dissociable (Blair and Cipolotti, 2000; Fine
et al., 2001; Bird et al., 2004). Moreover, the correlation
analysis excluded any relationship between mood and motor
impairment on task performance. It has to be noted that the
correlation between the EA score and the VAS-Mood score
was inverse; thus, it does not explain CB performance in EA
test.
Altogether, these findings indicated that in the presence
of cerebellar damage, the performances subtending the social
interaction become less accurate mainly when the stimuli require
automatic processing or a high level of prediction.
Particularly, regarding the automatic processing and the well-
known cerebellar role in implicit elaboration (Molinari et al.,
2002; Schmahmann, 2018), the cerebellummay act at the implicit
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Brain region Brodmann areas
x y z
Anterior Left I-IV 1024 −48 −20 28 4.97 L- Postcentral Gyrus 3
−54 12 8 4.58 L- Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44
−52 10 18 4.18
493 −38 50 0 4.66 L- Middle Frontal Gyrus 46
−40 46 10 4.41
−36 42 2 4.23 L- Orbitofrontal cortex 47
335 50 −30 36 4.39 R- Postcentral Gyrus 2
38 −32 40 3.98 R- Supramarginal Gyrus 40
40 −40 46 3.95 40
240 58 24 22 4.35 R- Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45
60 2 10 4.08 R- Rolandic Operculus –
50 −6 14 3.23
302 −6 36 14 4.03 L- Anterior Cingulate 24
6 36 8 3.53 R- Anterior Cingulate 25
6 36 24 3.52 32
Right I-IV 1189 −42 44 10 4.73 L- Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45
−38 42 0 4.57 L- Orbitofrontal Cortex 47
−38 50 2 4.33 L- Middle Frontal Gyrus 46
906 52 −4 20 4.61 R- Rolandic Operculum –
58 20 16 4.45 R- Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44
66 −12 24 3.99 R- Postcentral Gyrus 43
1411 −54 14 8 4.38 L- Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44
−48 −8 24 4.28 L- Precentral Gyrus 4
−46 −18 28 4.26 L- Postcentral gyrus 3
182 6 −28 44 3.90 R- Posterior Cingulate 23
14 −22 46 3.62
18 −28 42 3.35
Intermediate Left VI 192 −44 26 28 4.24 L- Middle Frontal Gyrus 46
−48 26 36 4.17
−42 32 38 3.47
Right VI 447 −50 6 18 4.28 L- Precentral gyrus 6
−52 20 −8 3.70 L- Temporal Pole 38
−54 12 24 3.60 L- Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44
Posterior Left Crus I 295 −34 6 56 4.85 L- Middle Frontal Gyrus 8
−44 20 46 4.04 L- Middle Frontal Gyrus 9
1006 36 26 42 4.80 R- Middle Frontal Gyrus 9
28 22 40 4.77
28 8 42 4.40
406 26 54 0 4.71 R- Orbitofrontal Cortex 11
30 50 −10 3.56
28 28 12 4.21 R- Superior Frontal Cortex 10
246 48 36 16 3.71 R- Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45
30 34 16 3.68
36 40 16 3.67
L-Crus II 366 30 22 44 4.58 R- Middle Frontal Gyrus 8/9
46 24 40 4.18
36 18 48 3.96
R-Crus I 239 −46 28 14 4.50 L- Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45
(Continued)
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Brain region Brodmann areas
x y z
210 −30 −14 56 3.96 L- Precentral Gyrus 6
−34 −8 42 3.89
−34 4 62 3.77
Vermis VIIIA 7964 −44 20 28 4.43 L - Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44
36 14 30 3.77 R - Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44
−16 10 60 3.60 L - Superior Frontal Gyrus 6
2783 −40 58 16 3.79 L- Frontal Pole 46
−34 −56 32 3.77 L - Angular Gyrus 19
−58 −42 −6 3.66 L- Middle Temporal Cortex (STS) 21/22
VI 228 −42 48 −4 4.36 L- Frontal Pole 47
−40 40 −16 3.89 L- Frontal Pole 47
−30 50 −10 3.68 L- Frontal Pole 11/47
202 26 8 44 4.27 R- Middle Frontal Gyrus 6/8
34 8 52 4.02 R- Middle Frontal Gyrus 9
16 2 40 3.55 R- Anterior Cingulate 24
387 −12 8 50 4.11 L- Supplementaly Motor Area 6
−16 12 64 4.01
−10 8 58 3.79
IX 635 −30 20 56 3.78 L- Middle Frontal Gyrus 8
−40 12 54 3.77 L- Middle Frontal Gyrus 9
−16 16 46 3.56 L- Anterior Cingulate 32
MNI coordinates (x, y, z) in the Montreal Neurological Institute space and peak Z score of the peak voxels showing the greatest statistical differences in a cluster are reported. Only
regions that survived after correction for multiple comparisons (FWE corrected p < 0.05) were considered. NoV = number of voxels; L: left; R: right.
level by matching the external information (i.e., expression of
the eyes) with the internal model of eye-region expression linked
to previous emotional experiences, contributing to guarantee an
immediate judgment about the mental state of others. When
cerebellar damage is present, the required fast and continuous
exchange of information between the external stimuli and the
internal model might be affected, thus interfering with the
automatic processes.
At a more complex level, to obtain a sense of another
individual’s state of mind, we need to predict the social
consequences of how we act or what we say across various
contexts, and we have to understand what caused a specific
behavior and how it may impact the social situation (Mahon and
Caramazza, 2008; Koster-Hale and Saxe, 2013). In this context,
the capacity to recognize deviations/errors in the outcome of a
social interaction and to use this information to regulate and
adjust future social expectations becomes useful for adaptive
social behavior.
To study error processing in the ToM domain, Berthoz
et al. (2002) used a contrast between scenarios in which a
social prediction was confirmed or violated. They found that
violations of social norms elicited higher activation not only in a
frontotemporal network associated with social cognition but also
in the cerebellum. According to the forward model theory (Ito,
2008), signals from the cerebellum might continuously check
whether an anticipated event based on social information fits
with current behavior, contributing to the more complex and
abstract forms of prediction and guaranteeing fluid control in
social interactions. In the presence of cerebellar dysfunction, the
error signal is missed, and the performance becomes less accurate
when the level of predictive load is high.
The present data are in line with the idea that the cerebellum
plays a role both in implicit processes and in prediction
mechanisms (Doyon et al., 2003) and reinforce the idea that
the cerebellum can be conceptualized as a unique predictive
structure in different domains and that its functional role in social
cognition is similar to that for sensorimotor control (Wolpert and
Kawato, 1998; Ito, 2008; Sokolov et al., 2017).
In the social domain, the processing mechanisms are
supported by the bidirectional anatomical connections of
the cerebellum with limbic areas and specific portions of
the frontal and temporo-parietal lobes that are involved in
emotional regulation and in the perception of socially salient
material (Schmahmann, 1991; Schmahmann and Pandya, 1997;
Middleton and Strick, 2001; Kelly and Strick, 2003). Coherently,
in the present study, CB patients showed structural and
functional alterations within cerebello-cortical networks that are
involved in different aspects of social interactions. Specifically, in
our patients, cerebellar atrophy, in terms of GM reduction, was
localized in specific portions of the vermis (VI, IX, VIIIa) and in
lobule VI.
fMRI studies demonstrated that these cerebellar areas are
activated during classic mirror tasks (Van Overwalle et al., 2014)
and belong to the Salience Network (SN) as well as to the
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Default Mode Network (DMN) (Habas et al., 2009; Buckner
et al., 2011). Moreover, the posterior vermis is recruited during
emotional processing (Baumann and Mattingley, 2012), and
indeed, it is considered the “limbic cerebellum” (Schmahmann,
2007; Stoodley and Schmahmann, 2010).
In our cerebellar patients, these regions of reduced GM also
showed decreased FC with cerebral areas involved in mirroring,
emotional and mentalizing processing, such as the middle
frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus, premotor cortex, orbitofrontal
cortex, anterior cingulate, inferior frontal gyrus, angular gyrus,
STS and temporal pole (Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).
Indeed, it has been evidenced that higher-order cortices in the
temporal pole, orbitofrontal cortex and inferior frontal gyrus
subserve the processing of emotions from facial expression and
in emotional contagion (Adolphs, 2004; Chakrabarti et al., 2006;
Dapretto et al., 2006; Gazzola et al., 2006; Jabbi et al., 2007;
Ross and Monnot, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). The superior
temporal sulcus and premotor cortex belong to the mirror
network (Bickart et al., 2014). The medial prefrontal cortex,
medial temporal lobe and angular gyrus belong to the DMN,
which is thought to be involved in mental simulation for
planning, self-evaluation, and social interaction (Habas et al.,
2009).
We also found a pattern of GM reduction in the anterior
cerebellum (bilateral lobule I-IV). These cerebellar regions are
more involved in somatosensory and motor control aspects
(Schmahmann, 2010; Stoodley and Schmahmann, 2010). As
expected, these lobules showed reduced FC with the precentral
gyrus, postcentral gyrus, and rolandic operculum. However, we
also observed a pattern of decreased FC between the anterior
cerebellum and cerebral areas involved in the mirror network
and mentalizing processes, such as the inferior frontal gyrus,
supramarginal gyrus (Reed and Caselli, 1994; Carlson, 2012),
anterior and posterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex and
middle frontal gyrus (in the dlPFC).
Finally, the posterior cerebellum showed a specific pattern
of GM reduction mainly localized in the bilateral crus I/II. The
posterior lateral cerebellum has been described as involved in
more reflective, cognitive components of the mentalizing tasks
(Sokolov et al., 2017). Interestingly, our CB patients showed a
pattern of decreased FC between these posterior regions of the
cerebellum and areas of the cerebral cortex involved in high-
order social behavior and executive control, such as the dmPFC
and the superior frontal gyrus and orbitofrontal cortex (Habas
et al., 2009; Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Shamay-Tsoory,
2011; Bickart et al., 2014).
Overall, in our patients, the structural alterations in the
specific lobule of the cerebellum interfered with the modulatory
function that the cerebellum exerts on the cortical projection
areas, thus accounting for altered functional connectivity in
the cerebellar-cortical networks involved in different aspects of
social cognition and, in particular, in the mentalizing process.
Indeed, the disrupted cerebellar modulatory function resulted
in impaired ToM outcomes, particularly when the stimuli
processing requires a high level of prediction.
In light of the present observations, the cerebellum could
be conceptualized as a part of the social brain by virtue of the
role that it plays in supporting other more classically social
regions (Jack and Morris, 2014). Particularly, the cerebellar-
cerebral networks could have a role in the predictive aspects of
social behavior by guaranteeing the continuous communication
between cerebellar modules and projection cerebral areas.
Therefore, important theoretical breakthroughs can be made
by studying cerebellar function in social behavior from the
prediction perspective.
LIMITATIONS
The present study is correlative at descriptive level and does not
bring evidence of a direct link between the observed atrophies
in the cerebellum and the reported performances in social and
cognitive tasks. This is a limitation due to the heterogeneity of the
study population and needs to be addressed in patients affected
by homogeneous cerebellar pathologies.
Another important issue that needs to be discussed is that,
even if in the present study the macroscopic damage of cerebral
cortex was excluded by the visual inspection of the clinical
MRI scans by an expert neuroradiologist and there was not
a significant difference in the total GM volume between CB
patients and HS, the possibility of local andmicroscopic GM loss,
as reported in previous studies (Brenneis et al., 2003; Della Nave
et al., 2008; Selvadurai et al., 2016) cannot be ruled out.
However, it has to be noted that the aim of the present study
was to investigate the cerebello-cerebral functional connectivity
that it is particularly suitable for the study of the cerebellum,
in which the function of each sub-region is defined by its
connections with specific brain areas (Schmahmann and Pandya,
1997; Middleton and Strick, 2001).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, in the presence of cerebellar damage, patients
fail in both automatic lower-level and conceptual/abstract
components of social cognition, and the idea can be advanced
that the cerebellar modulatory function on the cortical projection
areas subtends these processes. These findings can be explained
considering different aspects of the prediction mechanisms
needed for the social interactions (Brown and Brüne, 2012)
and taking into account the connections that the cerebellum
has with limbic areas and specific portions of the frontal
and temporo-parietal lobes involved in metalizing processes
(Schmahmann and Pandya, 1997; Middleton and Strick, 2001).
According to the “sequence detection theory” (Braitenberg
et al., 1997; Leggio et al., 2011; Leggio and Molinari, 2015),
during social interactions in which event sequences play
a role, the cerebellum allows the prediction of the other
person’s behaviors in an intuitive way to optimize the social
behavior.
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